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Summary
Network security is becoming increasingly vital in today's fast
growing mobile computing environment. Due to constraints in
device size and portability, limited processing power, small disk
capacity, intermittent network disconnections and freguent
switching between network access points have been observed in
mobile devices. Thus, protocols for mobile devices must
minimize processing overhead to save battery power. In addition,
connectivity performance and reliability need to be maintained as
in wired environment. [n order to achieve this, usage ofresource
intensive methods for instance public key cryp-tography and
central verification server is foreseen to be reduced. Nonetheless,
this poses a security threat to the system. It should be noted that if
server security is being easily penehated especially in the wireless
network, the attacker can control the compromised parfy's side ofthe communication channel. In this study, improved re_
authentication scheme have been focused on, by performing
comprehensive analysis to prcpose an enhanced authentication
protocol which supports fast re-autlentication for connection or
disconnection of client-server system and other possibility of
enhancement in terms of message reduction besides providing
more secured solutions through CSp (Communicating Sequential
Process) protocol modeling.
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1. fntroduction
Advancements in wireless networking technology and
portable information appliances have provoked mobile
computing, in which portable devices users have access to
information services through a shared environment.
regardless of their physical locations.
Mobile computing is distinguished from conventional
wired computing from the mobility feature of users and
their computers and the mobile resource constraints such as
limitations in wireless bandwidth, battery power and disk
capacity. To overcome the constraints, sometimes it is
necessary to distort the client-server distinction r€source
limitations with migration of some client activities to
resource-rich serveni or by moving some seryer activities to
client-side in the event of disconnections [2].
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Mobility implies users require connection from different
access points through wireless links and stay connected all
time while on move, despite some intermittent
disconnections. Re-authenticating users at every connection
attempt increases number of connections when users
switched between access points. New pre-authentication
scheme for fast hand-off has been proposed [6] where
stations can authenticate with several access points (Aps)
during the scanning process. When connection is required,
authenticated stations are able to re-associate with Aps
immediately upon moving into their coverage area, rather
than waiting for the authentication exchange. pre-
authentication makes roaming a smootler operation
because authentication can take place before it is needed to
support an association. However, since this scheme could
not predict pattern of client moves in the future, the pre-
authentication may be useless in some cases and increases
traffrc in the wireless link.
Full authentication is time-consuming and iterations of
comprehensive cryptographic algorithms with frequent
retransmission of messages involved, adversely effects
network performance. Since re-authentication latency
affects the service quality of multimedia applications,
minimizing this factor is essential in order to support real-
time multimedia and streaming applications on the wirelessIP network in keeping pace with the ever-growing
multimedia technology.
Though providing lower level of security, secret key
encryption algorithm is faster than public-key methods.
However, faster algorithms, such as elliptic curve
cryptography, have extended the use of public kev
cryptography, by increasing security with lower
computational load. Hence, the motivation of this study is
to achieve high level of security via the use public key
cryptography scheme.
Result of this study addresses the possibility of
implementation through CSP (Communicating Sequential
Process) protocol modeling to perform data collection for
protocol benchmarking. Formal verification via third party
simulator; CASPER and FDR (Failure-Divergences
Refinement checker) is used to validate protocol
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performance besides debugging vulnerabilities and
identifying merits of the protocol
2. Theoretical Consideration
Mobile computing client-server systems can be viewed as a
specialized class of dishibuted systems where clients can
dlsengage from joint distributed operations, move freely in
the physical space and reconnect to a possibly different
segment of network; a collection of servers at a later stage
in order to resume suspended activities.
Mutual Authentication enables communicating parties to
satisff themselves mutually about each other's identity and
to exchange session keys before establishing a
communication session. Main problem of authenticated key
exchange are two issues: confidentiality and timeliness. To
prevent masquerade and to prevent compromise of session
keys, essential identification and session key information
must be communicated in encrypted form [9]. A system
that is authorized to transmit temporary session keys to
principals is called Key Distribution Center (KDC)' Each
session key is transmitted in encrypted form, using a master
key (typically, are distributed by non-cryptographic means)
that the key distributor shares with the target principal'
Certif.cate Authority (CA) is a ffusted third party which
certifies identities of other entities; users, clients and
servers. When it certifies a user' the certiflrcate authority
first seeks verification that the user is not in the Certificate
Revocation List (CRL). Upon verification, it grants a
certificate, signing it with the certificate authority's private
key. The certificate authority has its own certificate and
public key which it publishes. Servers and clients use these
io validate signatures the certificate authority has made'
2.1 Authentication for mobile client-server
Figure I illustrates an example of protocol message
"*ihunge 
level in mobile authentication which involves
mobile client, KDC and target application server [5] known
as M-PKINIT. In M-PKINIT, Client A only possesses a
signing key, but the similar key is usable with public key
encryption, allowing both signing and encryption' In this
situation, the client generates the session key and encrypts
it with the KDC's Public keY [11].
Normally, KDC will generate a session key and encrypts it
with the client's public key. This feature swaps a private
key operation for a public key operation on the mobile
platform, assuming that the client knows the KDC's public
key prior to receiving it as a part ofthe certification chain'
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Figure 1. Mobile Public Key Infrastructure
euthentication with KDC.
Upon establishing a trusted connection, the client will
request a reliable ticket to further communicate with the
application server through the secreV session key exchange.
The full authentication protocol involves multiple steps
which in the event of intermittent disconnections or hand-
offs, might incw intensive computations and involves more
message transactions.
2.2. Re-Authentication Protocol
Initial authentication schemes focused on connecting
mobile users to networks by validating only authorized
users shall access its services. Thus, secure establishment
of a session key for mutual authentication and non-
repudiation is the main aim. Due to performance reasons'
the solutions require secret key cryptography usage or the
RSA algorithm with short keys, resulted in lower level of
secwify. Despite of this disadvantage, it was necessary to
compromise. Multiple re-authentication approaches have
been proposed. Upon establishment of a communication
session for certain period of time, the client is required to
be re-authenticated via faster re-authentication. Low
computational intensive with limited security algorithm
secret key algorithm was used. In addition, the latency
from the re-authentication sessions incurred unnecessary
re-authentication overhead.
Other approach includes performing initial authentication
followed by less complex re-authentication when client
was disconnected. Another improved protocol, known as
Neuman-stubblebine, was introduced based on secret key
cryptography where the session key between the
communicating nodes was re-used in the re-authentication
process until it expired after a given time. This easily
comprises to security threat when frequent re-
authentication provide large amount of data for analysis by
an adversary. Protocol which combines nonce and public
key authentication to achieve high level of security with
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improvement in subsequent re-authentications. while
keeping the mobile client's computational load low by
moving the load to server has been introduced.
3. Design of Protocol
There are multiple major approaches to the specification
and analysis of authentication protocols. Each method has
their strengths and weaknesses. They are addressed as
below:
l.Use of existing formal methods to specifr and
analy ze authentication protocols
2. Use of logics of knowledge and belief
3.Use of expert systems and algebraic term-rewriting
systems
The above methods are all independent of the
cryptographic mechanism used. This is the strength since in
producing a protocol specification it is yet to specift a
particular implementation mechanism.
3.1 Communicating Sequential processes (CSp)
Communicating Sequential processes (CSp) is a notation
for describing systems of parallet agents that communicate
by passing messages between them. CSp is fundamentallv
a notation for describing interactiono and can be used to
describe a huge range of systems whose only feature in
common is that there are different components of
dishibuted computing systems, for example the protocols
that can describe interactions between humans and
machines. CSP is traditionally written in a fairly
matlematical notation, with special symbols representing
its operators, and is typeset core like mathematics than a
typical programming language [7].
3.2 Trustworthy processes
The typical security protocol involves several agents (often
two: an initiator and a responder) and perhaps a server that
performs some service such as key generation, translation
or certification.
3.2.lDate type for protocol models
Real implernentations of cr)?tographic protocols uses data
which is composed of blocks of bits, and encryption
algorithms are computed over the same type of structures
and.might have properties that are open to exploitation by
an intruder. In order to build CSp models, ibstract data
types are used. Rather than looking at tle representation in
bytes, and model all the constants like agent names, nonces
and keys as symbolic constants and constructions like
encry,ption, hashing as formal symbolic operations over the
type.
3.2.2 Modeling an Intruder
The solution is amazingly simple; build a process that can,
at any stage, perform any actions that is cryptographically
justifiable:
o Eavesdrop and/ or block message that one agent sends
to another (including servers)
. Generate any message that can be built on the basis of
what the intruder heard, knew initially, or might
legitimately made up (nonces and keys), all under the
assumptions of what if cryptographically feasible
. Act as agents other than those we explicitly build into
network as trustworthy; namely the intuder will have
all the keys, that such agents would have
3.2.3 Putting the network together
After having idea of how reliable agents, the server and
even the intruder operates. These will be put together into a
network that can be used to test the resilience of the
protocol.
3.3 Casper
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tr'igure 3. Casper high level overview [ll.
Casper is a compiler that converts a high level description
of a protocol to CSP code, [l] which is being executed in a
model checker for instance Failure Divergence ReJinement
@DR) fo ascertain whether the protocol meets the specified
requirements. Casper provides a simple but powerful high
level protocol definition language that is very convenient to
describe protocols, and diversifu high level simulation of
intuders' properties. It is role-based model checker with
formalized mathematical environment beneath. It interfaces
easily and intuitively to its protocol flaw checking tool,
FDR.
A few common steps could be followed to reduce the state
space required to represent the behaviors of system. There
has been approach to create a variety of heuristics to
minimize the search space to make the model checking
feasible.
3.4 Analyzing the Proposed Protocol Using
Casper
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The list notation is a compact but simple form widely used'
A protocol is formulated as a sequence of messages, with
the names of sender and receivers:
Message n a -) b: dats
The message content data can be composed of:
o atoms: This may be names, variables and literal constants'
. nonces: A nonce, usually notated like 'n"', is an
unpredictable, freshly generated unique number
The subscript indicates which participant created it for
notational convenience.
o Encryption: The term {data}k denotes the encryption of
data with the key k
o Authentication: Signk(data) denotes the signature ofdata
using the key k
o Concatenation: q.b denotes the concatenation of a and b,
for example the two terms are sent consecutively.
In order to generate a CSP description of the proposed
protocol, we first construct a Casper input file. The file
defines not only the operation ofthe protocol, but also the
system to be checked. The Casper input description hence,
contains two distinct Parts:
o A definition on which the protocol operates, describing
the messages passed between the agents, the tests
performed by the agents, the types of the data items used,
ih" ittitiul knowledge of the agents, a specification of
what the protocol is supposed to achieve, and a definition
ofany algebraic equivalences over the types used.
. A definition ofthe actual system to be checked, defining
the agents taking part in the actual system and the roles
they play, the actual data types to be used, and the
intruder's abilities.
The type of variables and functions that are used in the
protocol definition are defined under the heading '#Free
iariables' . The definition of free variables of the proposed
protocol takes the following form. We define the agents,
iymmetric keys, public keys, and nonce. The functions PrK
and SiK return an agent's public key and secret key
respectively.
#Free variables
a,b : Agent
Ira, kb : SessionKey
PK : Agent -> PublicKeY
SK : Agent -> SecretKeY
na: Nonce
Each agent running in the system will be represented by a
CSP process. The names of the CSP processes representing
all tlie agents are defined below. The parameters and
variables following keyword 'knows'define the knowledge
that the agent in question is expected to have at the initial
of the protocol run. Thus, client a of our protocol is
expected to know his own identity c, the server's identity b,
the session key la, his nonce na, the public key function
PK,andhis secret key SK(a).
#Processes
CLIENT(a,b,ka,na) btows PK, SK(a)
SERVER(b,a,kb) Imows PK, SK(b)
The main part of the definition of the protocol is the
definition of the sequence of messages in our protocol.
Example from Yahalom protocol:
#Protocol description
0.->a:b
1. a->b:na
2. D -> s.' {a, na, nb}{ServerKqt (b)}
3.a s -> a : ft, kab, na, nb]{ServerKey (a)}
3.b s -> b: {a, knb}{ServerKeY (b)}
4. a -> b: {nb} flrab}
Two kinds ofspecifications are currently supported: secrets
and authentication. Secret specifies that certain data items
should be secret. The first secret specification above may
be paraphrased as: a thinls that ka is a secret that can be
known to only itself and b. The lines starting Agreement
are authentication specifications. The ftrst Secret function
specifies that a is correctly authenticated to b, and the two
agents agree on the data values na.
l*SpeciJication
Secret(a,l@, Ibl)
Secret(b, kb, [a])
Agreement(a,b, [na])
The types ofvariables to be used in the actual system to be
checked are defined in a similar way to the types of free
variables.
#Actual variables
A, B, M: Agent
rA, rB, rM : SessionKey
Na, Nm: Nonce
InverseKeys : (rA,rA), (rB,rB), (rM,rM)
Any functions used by the agents in our protocol
description have to be defined under the #Function heading.
Public key functions and secret key functions of agents are
shown as follows:
#Functions
symbolic PK, SK
The system definition specifies which agents in the system
need to be checked. We consider a system with a single
client r{ and a single server B. They use rA, rB, Na.
tlSystem
CLIENT(A, B, rA, Na)
SERVER(B, A, rB)
Finally, the operation of the intruder is specified by grving
his identity, and the set of data values that he initially
knows. The following description defines the intuder's
identity to be M, and the intruder initially knows all the
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agents' identities, his session key rM, his nonce Nm, public
key functions, and his secret key SK(M).
#Intruder Informstion
Intruder = M
IntruderKnowledge = {A,8, M, pK, rM, Nm, SK(M)}
3.5 Proposed Design
The proposed protocol design is illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Nonce-based with hybrid keys fast re-
authentication protocol.
3.5.1 Initial Authentication
Extract of CSP notation:
#Free variahles
a, b : Agent
ka, kb : SessionKey
PKey : Agent -> PublicKey
SKey : Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (PKey,SKey), (ka,ka), (kb,kb)
na: Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR (a,b,la,na) lotows pKey, SKey(a)
RESPONDER (b,a,kb) lmows PKey, SKey(b)
#Protocol descrtption
0. ->a:b
[a!:bJI. a -> b : {b,ka}{PKey(b)}, na, {ft,ka}{eKey(b)},
nn){SKey(a)}
[a!:b]
2. b -> a : a, kn(+)kb, {a,ka(+)kb}{SKey(b)}, {na}{kb}
lLSpeciftcation
Secret(a, ko, Ibl)
Secret(b, kb, [a])
Agreement(a, b, [naJ)
l. Client z{ initiates the session with a random number
generation, nonce kA as the key-encryption key. I
sends message (l) to server.B containing pB(B,kA\,I's nonce na, A's signature over pB(B,ft,4') and na,
together with own certificate certA which contains,{'s
identity A, A's ECC encrypted public key pl, plus
trusted certificate server CA's signature, SCA over
these SCA(,{,P,4).
2. 8 receives message from A and verifies ,{,s identity,
integnty of message through CA's signature, SCA and
,{'s signature. .B who kept CA's signature public key
then decrypts PB(B,bA) using its RSA private key and
obtains kA. B need not keep the client's public key to
verifr ,4's signature, since ,{ has sent the message
containing its public key (certA).
3. B generates random number kB as a session key
between A and B.Using Vernam encryption of two
keys /r,4 and kB and then sends message (2) which
consists of certB as B's identity validity, ,4's identity,
,4's nonce which are encrypted under the session key
/rB, signature over A and encryption of (M,kB) to
client A. B's identity is authenticated.
4. A then decrypts encrypted (M,kB) by its key-
encryption key M and gets hB as a session key with B.I authenticates the session key hB explicitly and also
verifies that the nonce nA is the same as it had
included in message (l). Matching I ensures freshness
to the session key kB. Therefore, A a.nd B share
mutually authenticated session key, kB.
ECC encryptions Protocol pseudo (V6ronique Cortier):
A, B: principal
f : nutnber -> number
G,Q : public point
k : fresh number
sa,d : private key of A
m,n: number
A chooses a number k.
A 
,computes k.G : (x1,y1), r : xI mod n and s :
Ir'(f(m)+dr).
I. A -> B: m,(r,s)
Computation done by .B to check the identity of sender z{.
The agent B verifies:
X= ((m)s_I).G' + (rs_I).Q
= (f(m) (k_I (f(m) +dr) 
_t )G' + (rft_t (f(n) +4r)_r ). (d.G)
= (f(n) (f(n) +dr) 
_1 k). G' + (r(f(m) +dr) 
_I k). (d.G): (f(m) (f(m) + dr) 
_I k + r (f(m) + dr) 
_I kd). G: (f(n) (f(m) + dr) 
_I + dr((m) + dr) 
_I ). (k G)
= (f(m) + dr) (f(m) + dr) 
_I ). (k. c)
= I.(k.G), since s : 0
:KG
3.5.2 Subsequent Re-authentications
Figure 5 illustrates the subsequent re-authentications
process that used in our design.
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Figure 5. DH reduces message exchange in subsequent
r€-authentications.
Extract of CSP notation:
#Processes
INITTATOR(A,kob)
RESPONDER(B,lnb)
#Protocol description
0. ->A:B
-IA!=B]
1. A->B: Exp(G,kab) % hkeYA
[A!=B and goodftkeyA)]
< key : : Exp (hkeyA, kab) >
2. B->A: Exp(G,kab) % hkeYB
[B!:A and good(hkeyB)J
<key : : Exp (hkey B,keb) >
i. A->: key
#Channels
authenticated
l.zl computes gl(mod n), where x is previously secret
session key between client A and B communications,
and send to B. A have in hand the result of predicted
computed retum result from B which is supposed to be
g(mod n)" to open communication with.B.
2. With the provided value from z{, B computes the
common shared value g"(mod n)v where y is also the
previously secret session key between client A and B
iommunications. The data according to protocol step 2
is sent back to l.
3.Upon two parties re-authentication and guarantees of
the messages were authentic, both ,4 and B will resume
communications through the authenticated channel'
This reduces message exchange between client and the
server during re-authentications contributing in faster re-
authentications. Previous re-authentications require mufual
authentications between A and B involving public key
encryptions.
4. Implementation and Results
This section provides details on the experiment constituted
to model NBA-ECC protocol for CSP formal verification
under SUSE 9.3 Linux environment. The proposed
protocol is based on a symmetric key, nonce-based mutual
authentication which enables two participants, the client
and server to establish a conrmon secret key using
symmetric cryptography and a trusted third party, CA
server. This protocol uses the trusted entity in the exchange
ofpublic keys.
4.1 Modeling the Protocol
The typical input file for Casper is being described into
parts of definrng the protocol as a template and defining the
actual system to be analyzed by FDR as the instantiation of
the template. Protocol extracts in CSP specification is as
specified in Section 3.1. The input file .spl is being
compiled into CSP script .csp from a more concise
description as in Figure 6. The type and consistency
checking is carried out to validate the CSP script produced
As known that the Casper takes an input file, and produces
an output file, that contains a CSP description of the systern
in question. This output is suitable for model checking
using the FDR as the extract captured shown in Figure 7.
Figure 6. CSP Compilation for Proposed Protocol.
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Figure 7. Captured FDR
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Formally, at the end of a successful protocol run each agent(,{,.B) should possess the other,s public key and ensure that
this key belongs to the other agent. In addition, the
participants of the protocol should be satisfied that the
session key is a suitable key for communication and that it
is fresh. Each agent should also be able to confirm that the
other protocol participant possesses the session key (SK)
and ensure it to be a shared secret. With this, both agents
are mutually authenticated to begin actual message
communications.
4.2 Analyzing Modeled protocol
Upon successful CSP compilation, Casper FDR is used to
validate whether the system satisfies the specifications and
analyze any corresponding attacks as denoted by the
system setup. Figure 8 indicates that the proposed protocol
is free from system level attack. Casper also generates a
refinement assertion for each authentication specification in
the input file, for each agents of the appropriate t)?e. The
SECRET and AUTH claim generalizes and asserts whether
the agent, based on the #speciJicalron definition has
completed a protocol run with legitimate agents.
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Figure 8: Fallure Divergence Refinement Checking.
l. The Intruder can capture messages between client-
server and delete them. It may result in fail in key
agreement of kb between two agents causing
disconnections in mutual authentication.
2.It is possible to fake certificate's identity easily.
Powerful inkuder can sniff the certificates. However,
as the identities in the certificate have been encrypted
with PK and ECC signed by both client-server, it has
further prevent intruder from masquerading the
identities ofinitiator (client) and responder (server).
Data collection upon formal verification using Casper has
been compiled and summarized from the status as seen in
Figure 9, with each rounds of protocol run.
Casper / FDR2 has successfully analyzed and discovered
flaws in a wide range of protocols. Among the protocols of
the Clark/Jacob library, it has found attacks on 20 protocols
previously known to be insecure, as well as attacks on l0
other protocols originally reported as secure [3].
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Figure 9: Refinement Check Result Status.
In order to simulate potential system attacks to the
proposed protocol, four different system environments has
been established by changing the #system notations and
#Intruderl<nowledge.
tASpecification
Secret(a, lca, tbl)
Secret(b, kb, [a])
Agreement(a, b, fnaJ)
System 1: Intruder, Ivo knows both I and .B existence.
with respective PKeys.
Result: No attack in secret and agreement scheme.
#System
INfTIATOR(Alice, Bob, Ka, Na)
RESPONDER(Bob, Alice, Kb)
#Int,ruder fnformationIntruder = IvofntruderKnowledge = {A1ice, Bob, Ivo,PKey, KI, Nf, SKey(Ivo) )
4.3 Result of Verification
The protocol satisfies the consfraint for secrecy of the
symmetric session key. A nonce is incorporated to assure
the freshness of the received message. The protocol
basically needs two message exchanges for compiete key
establishment; message sent, message received, exponential
computations between the client and seryer. Key
management problan does not exist as it eliminates KDC(Key Disbibution Centre) and uses both symmetric_key
and public-key schemes. It increases efficiency since it
uses ECC-based signature whose key size is considerably
smaller than other signature schemes.
When this description of protocol in Casper is run with
FDR tool, we found some flaws in the protocol. Some
security properties below are at risk:
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System 2: lntruder, Ivo listens to message I sent over by
Initiator,.4 and nonce r{ is known by lvo'
Result: No threats of active attack in secret and agreement
scheme.
#System
INITIATOR(A.lice, Ivo, Ka, Na)
RESPONDER(Bob, A1ice, Kb)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = fvo
lntruderKnowledge = {ati-ce, Bob, Ivo,
PKey, KI, NI, SKeY(fvo) )
System 3: Intruder, Ivo masquerades and listens to both I
and B by eavesdropping authentication messages transacted
between both Parties.
Result: No threats of active attack in secret and agreement
scheme.
#System
INITIATOR(A1iCC, IrrO, KA, NA)
RESPONDER(Bob, Ivo, Kb)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Ivo
InEruderKnowledge = {a1ice, Bob, Ivo,
PKey, KI, NI, SKeY(Ivo) )
System 4: Intruder, lvo successfully attained the session
key established by both Parties.
Result: Attack found upon key compromised in secret
scheme authentications between I and B.
#SYstem
INITIATOR(AIice, Bob, Ka, Na)
RESPONDER(Bob, A1ice, Kb)
#Intruder InformauionIntruder = Ivo
Intrud.erKnowledge = {elice, Bob, Ivo,
PKey, KI , NI , SKeY(Ivo), I(b)
This experiment firmly concludes that the freshness and
confidentialif of the session key established upon mutual
authentication against exposure to intruder is crucially
essential to avoid key compromise and subsequently
communication intrusion by adversaries.
4.4 Result Comparison
The key concept demonstrated by the performance
measurements is the benefit of fast re-authentication in a
wireless environment. Characteristics of the proposed
protocol are analyzed and compared with existing re-
authentication protocols in terms of certain factors' It is
vital to satisfu the foltowing characteristics [8] as in their
proposed key distribution protocol:
o Nature of the authentication; authentication entity
and key authentication should be provided.
o Reciprocity of authentication; each of the
authentication entity and key authentication may be
unilateral or mutual.
o Key freshness where a session key is fresh from the
viewpoint of one party, if it can be guaranteed to be
new. It is opposed to possibly an old session key
being reused through the actions of an adversary.
o Efficiency; considerations include the number of
message exchange required between parties,
bandwidth required by the message (total number of
bits tansmitted) and processing complexities for
each PartY.
Table I reflects the micro-benchmarks of ECC
performance advantage over RSA for different security
levels. ECC performance advantage increases even faster
than its key-size advantage, as security needs increase.
Table l.Comparison of ECC and RSA Micro-benchmark llluslrated from [{l'
ECC-I60 RSA-I024 F',CC.I92 RSA-I536 ECC-224
Ons/sec 271.3 114.3 268.5 36.4 195.s 17.8
Performance ration 2.4 21 7.4 21 21.4 z I
Kev-size ration 126.4 1:E I :9.1
Our result is summarized in Table 2 which derives the
number of total messages and hansitions with respective
average execution time (second) for each protocol
modeled and run in CSP. The table comprises of the
comparison of the protocol with other five well-known
client-server authentication protocols in the mobile
computing environment and also two subsequent
authentication Pseudos.
The number of messages is one important factor which
affects effrciency of the protocol. The number of
messages sent or received also affects each entity's
processing complexity. The load balance of messages for
each entity also has to be considered. A look at the
execution times for different protocols provides fair idea
of the correlation between the protocol complexity and
execution times. The aYerage re-authentication response
time of protocol after network disconnections is measured
to ensure it offers good scalabillty and performance, and
suitable for practical applications.
The initial authentication key size is small by replacing
crurent initial authentication using Public Key Encryption
with ECC. High security level is still maintained. Upon
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re-connecting to another server, the ECC-based protocol
is foreseen to provide faster re-connections with smaller
bandwidth, which is essential to mobile computing
environment.
The proposed subsequent authentication protocol is
designed to achieve faster re-authentications after
temporary disconnections using optimized Diffie-
HellmanJike session keys mutual authentications, which
reduces message exchange to two steps during both
parties verification. Low computational load is placed on
the mobile client by performing full authentication
protocol at initial connection.
Tsble 2. Protocols Characteristics
Qeli
10
I
4
0
Inltlal Authentlcadon (Numb€r of TrrnCtond execution time -3 seconds is ranked mediocre in this
experiment as in Figure I l.
For subsequent authentications using Diffie-Hellman
concept as proposed, the number of transitions is
considerably low compared to the existing re-
authentications protocol. The lower the number of
messages and hansitions, tle less risks of attacks of replay,
eavesdrop and tracing by intruders on subsequent
authentications based on the mufually agreed valid session
keys (Figure l2).
Inldal Aullrendca0on (Execudon Tlme)
Figure 11: Average Execution Time (Secs).
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Figure 10. Number of Transitions and Messages
Transaction for Initial Authentication.
Figure l0 indicates the low number of hansitions for the
proposed protocol corresponding to only 3 messages
exchange for initial authentication compared to the resiof
the protocols. With lesser number of transitions. it will
lower risks of exposure to active and passive attacks
during mutual authentication.
Although the number of transitions is considerably the
lowest among the rest, the proposed protocol average
Protocol Encrypt
Scheme
Use of
Nonce
Number of
total messages
Number of
transitions (Avg)*
Execution time
sec (Avg)
Attacks
nitial Authentication
Veedham Schroeder PK Symmetric Yes 7 t2,132 I Yes
Dtway Rees Symmetric Yes 4 4,920 6 No
KLS Symmehic Yes 3 2,366 J Yes
Yahalom Synmetric Yes 4 779 I No
fahalom3 Symmetric Yes 4 581 4 No
\IBA-ECC Hybrid Yes 2 ll 3 No
Subsequent Authentication
!{eumann Stubblemine
t{BA-non DH
{BA-DH like
Symmetric
Symmetric
Hybrid
Yes
Yes
No
J
3
278
2l
50
I
I
I
No
No
No
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Figure 12: Number of Transitions and Messages
Transaction for Subsequent Authentications.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Wireless devices need to utilize Public Key Cryptography
which is widely used to solve many security issues such as
authentication and key exchange. While RSA algorithms
(as one of widely known public-key encryption algorithm)
are common in public key applications, there are other
ciphers that are also of interest for authentication. The
PKINIT draft cited the Diffre-Hellman key establishment
atgorithm as an obligatory implementation requirement
1tbl. fhere has also been significant interest and use of
ettiptic curve-based encryption algorithms in mobile
computing environments.
ECC algorithm is believed to provide comparable security
levels to RSA with a smaller key which resulted in a less
computationally intensive calculation. The extension of
the analysis to substitute Diffie-Hellman or ECC for RSA
which potentially reduces the message transmission during
authentication in mobile client-server communication has
been recommended in [5] for future advancements' There
is also an urge to enable broad industry adoption of ECC
by promoting ECC standardization within SSL, the
dominant security protocol used on the Internet, and
contributing ECC technology to OpenSSL and
NSS/Ivlozilla the two most popular open source
cryptographic libraries [4].
A number of protocols are designed to provide repeated
authentication. These are typically in two stages: (i) an
initial authentication, during which a key and ticket (or
key certificate) is established; (ii) repeat authentication,
which be repeated several times. A ticket is used to re-
establish subsequent authentications. With this research
experiments, Casper currently has no way of specifring
that part (ii) may be repeated arbitrarily multiple times
using the ticket established in part (t). However, it is
attainable to model the two parts separately or to model a
Subs6qu€nt Arthentlca0on (Numbsr of Transldm)
\
-
-\
-"----
2
l1
.o
system that runs part (D followed by a single instance of
part (ii).
Future research is intended to extend the Casper syntax to
allow the users to speciff definitions of the protocol which
constitutes repeating authentication phases (possibly with
fresh nonces). This is to enable a more complete and
accurate analysis ofsuch protocols [3].
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